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Attorneys' Trust Accounts: The Bar's Role in the
Preservation of Client Property
I. INTRODUCTION
Trust is the foundation of the attorney-client relationship.' When an individual
relies on an attorney for legal assistance, that person places his trust not only in the
individual attorney, but also in the legal profession itself. 2 An attorney serves as
counselor and advocate, and she is charged to fulfill these obligations according to the
canons of professional ethics.3 The profession itself carries the responsibility of
"keeping its own house." '4 Effective professional self-regulation is essential to
"preserving public faith in the integrity of the administration of justice" and to
"maintaining the legal profession's reputation for trustworthiness." 5
Never is an individual's trust in attorneys more evident, or more at risk, than
when he places funds or property into the hands of his attorney.6 Numerous situations
may require the holding of a client's funds, including estate proceeds, escrow funds,
funds for the payment of the client's taxes, and funds for settlement purposes. Other
common situations may call for the receiving of funds on the client's behalf,
including judgment awards, proceeds of a settlement, proceeds from the liquidation
of a client's business, and proceeds from the sale of a client's real or personal
property. Unfortunately, ethical violations involving the mishandling of client funds
are also common. It is the obligation of the bar itself, as well as of the individual
attorney to see that funds are not mishandled.
1. "The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel. For in other confidences, men commit
the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair;, but to such as they make their
counsellors, they commit the whole: by how much the whole they are obligated to all faith and integrity." F. BACON, Of
Counsel, in THE WoRKs OF LORD BAcoN 277 (1846).
2. It is a trust built on centuries of honesty and faithfulness. Sometimes it is reinforced by personal
knowledge of a particular lawyer's integrity or a firm's reputation. The underlying faith, however, is in the legal
profession, the bar as an institution. No other explanation can account for clients' customary willingness to
entrust their funds to relative strangers simply because they are lawyers.
In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 455, 409 A.2d 1153, 1154-55 (1979).
3. The codes of professional ethics differ from state to state, but generally will be in a form similar to either the
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFEssiONAL REsoNsirBSrv (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE], or the ABA MODEL RUaS oF PROF.SSIONAL
Co.GDucr (1983) [hereinafter MoDEL RuL.s]. For a list of the states that have adopted the new MODEL RuLs as of July, 1987,
see Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3 (1987). Judges and practicing attorneys should be well aware of the
ethical rules applicable in their jurisdiction.
4. "We are engaged in a profession that serves the public and enjoys a monopoly in that service. . . .The public
looks to the profession to keep its own house in order ...." Report of the Special Committee on Clients' Security
Funds, 84 Rrrors oF TmE A.B.A. 605, quoted in In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382, 384 (Del. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 274 (1970).
5. Soule, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients' Funds: A Study in Professional Responsibility, 10 U. MxcH. J.L.
REF. 415, 420 (1977). "The trust placed in the lawyer owes its origin to the special professional status he occupies as a
licensed practitioner. Public confidence in the practitioner is essential to the proper functioning of the profession." State
ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 267 (Okla. 1982).
6. Observe that these funds are placed into accounts appropriately referred to as "Attorney Trust Accounts."
"Few duties placed upon the lawyer are more fundamental, more clearly defined, more easily followed and more
necessary to promote public trust and confidence in the legal profession than the absolute inviolability of an attorney's
trust account." In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 88, 614 P.2d 1264, 1271 (1980) (Stafford, J., disssenting).
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This Comment focuses on the duty to preserve client property. It examines not
only the ethical rules governing individual attorneys 7 but also the role of the legal
profession itself in the preservation of client funds. Violations involving client funds
(including commingling and misappropriation) account for about fourteen percent of
all disbarments and about eight percent of all suspensions nationally.8 This Comment
focuses on efforts by the profession to decrease these startling statistics.
This Comment first examines the means available to prevent the mishandling of
client funds. 9 These steps include the education of attorneys in the mechanics of trust
account maintenance and the direct regulation of trust accounts to monitor compli-
ance with the ethical rules. Both are essential to ensure the protection of client funds
and the preservation of the public's trust in the legal profession. 10 Next, this
Comment discusses efforts to compensate victims of attorney misconduct, such as the
adoption of Clients' Security Fund programs in most states." The success of such
compensation programs is essential to the profession's claim that protection of the
public is one of its primary concerns.
Finally, this Comment addresses the discipline of attorneys who misuse client
funds.12 It is generally recognized that in determining whether and to what extent
to discipline an attorney, the principal concerns are "the protection of the public,
the preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the
highest possible professional standard for attorneys." 13 For misappropriation of
client funds, courts generally hold that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 14
However, mitigating factors are often given such weight that this sanction frequently
is not imposed.' 5 This Comment argues that mitigating factors are not as compelling
7. See infra section H. This Comment will not attempt to provide an indepth analysis of each state's ethical rules
concerning the preservation of client property. Rather, the focus of this Comment will be on the obligations of the bar
itself to see that attorneys do not mishandle client funds.
8. See Couric, What Goes Wrong?, 72 A.B.A. J. 65 (Oct. 1986). In individual states these percentages may be
much higher. See, e.g., Johnson, Lawyer, Thou ShallNot Steal, 36 RrrERs L. REv. 454,456-59 (1984) (noting that since
1948, more than half the attorney discipline imposed in New Jersey was for financial improprieties).
9. See infra section Ill.A.
10. "[W]hen a lawyer embezzles his client's funds, the whole bar is blackened in the public eye. The rest of us,
as well as the embezzler, are considered at fault because we have failed to police our own ranks and to prevent the
defalcation." Report of the Special Committee on Client's Security Funds, 84 REsorrrs oF Tim A.B.A. 605, quoted in In
re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382, 384 (Del. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 274 (1970).
11. See infra section In.B.
12. See infra section m.C.
13. Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452, 458, 714 P.2d 1239, 1243, 224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105 (1986). The courts
of many states have explicitly adopted this view. See, e.g., In re Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491,493, 652 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1982);
Disciplinary Board v. Kim, 59 Haw. 449, 455,583 P.2d 333, 337 (1978); In re Nadler, 91 Il. 2d 326, 333, 438 N.E.2d
198, 201 (1982); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Alker, 491 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (La. 1986); Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599, 609, 441 A.2d 328, 333 (1982); Mississippi State Bar Ass'n v. A Mississippi Attorney, 489
So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 1986); State er rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Statmore, 218 Neb. 138, 143, 352 N.W.2d
875, 878 (1984); In re Carroll, 127 N.H. 390, 393, 503 A.2d 750, 751 (1985); In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451,456, 409 A.2d
1153, 1155 (1979); In re Bristow, 301 Or. 194, 206, 721 P.2d 437, 443-44 (1986); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Keller, 509 Pa. 573, 579, 506 A.2d 872, 875 (1986); Carter v. Ross, 461 A.2d 675, 676 (R.I. 1983); In re Salvesen, 94
Wash. 2d 73, 76, 614 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1980). The American Bar Association has also endorsed this approach. See ABA
STANDs FOR hnosmno LAwYER SANcrroNs, Standard 1.1 (1986) [hereinafter SArcnox STr~AARDs]. For a detailed discussion
of the SArcnoN STANDARoS f llowing their adoption, see Cameron, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions-A Long
Overdue Document, 19 Assz. ST. L.J. 91 (1987).
14. See infra section III.C.1.
15. See infra section Ill.C.2.
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in cases of misappropriation and that disbarment should be imposed more consis-
tently.
II. EmucAL RuLEs RESPECTING CLIENTS' PROPERTY
A. Trust Account Requirements
1. Rule 1.15 and DR 9-102
The ethical rules concerning the preservation of client property are found in Rule
1.15 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct16 or DR 9-102 of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.17 The principal requirement is that funds and other
property of a client must be kept separate from the attorney's business or personal
funds. 18 The underlying rationale for the rule is that if client funds are commingled
with the attorney's own funds, the separate identity of the client's funds is lost, and
the money may be used to pay the attorney's business or personal expenses.19 While
commingling of funds can result in disciplinary action, 20 the sanction is likely to be
16. MODEL RuLES, supra note 3, Rule 1.15 provides:
(a) A lawyer sh?'J hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with
a representation. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is
situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of [five] years after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as provided in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and
another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and
severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall
be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
17. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 9-102 provides:
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be
deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated
and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(I) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to a lawyer or law fin must be
deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the
right of the lawyer or law firn to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall
not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit
box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession
of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the
possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.
As noted earlier, supra at note 3, some states have adopted the new MODEL RuLEs, while others have retained the MODEL
CoDE.
18. MODEL RuEa, supra note 3, Rule 1.15 (a); MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 9-102 (A). See generally Laviano
& Thompson, Trust Fund Accountability, R.I.B.J., May 1981, at 8, discussing the fiduciary nature of an attorney's
obligations with respect to his clients' funds.
19. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Tuttle, 41 Ohio St. 2d 183, 184-85, 324 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1975) (quoting
Clark v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 161, 168, 246 P.2d 1, 5 (1952)).
20. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Padgett, 481 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1986) (six month suspension); State v. Hohman, 233
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much more severe if client funds are actually converted to the attorney's own use.2 1
In neither case is a claim of simple mismanagement recognized as a defense or
mitigating factor. 22
The rules also address the issue of "disputed funds." If an attorney and her
client are in disagreement over to whom funds belong, the rule is clear: the funds are
to be treated as trust funds and kept separate until the dispute is resolved. 23 One
question not explicitly resolved in the rules is whether retainer fees are trust funds that
must be safeguarded. 24 However, it should be clear that absent an agreement to the
contrary, the attorney is not entitled to the retainer fee until she earns it by providing
legal services.
Finally, the rules require the maintenance of adequate trust account records.
While the Model Code simply requires that records be kept, 25 the Model Rules are
more specific in requiring that such records be preserved for at least five years
following termination of the representation. 26 Some states require that records be kept
for longer periods. 27 The maintenance of such records is essential if the profession is
to monitor compliance with the ethical rules.2 8
2. Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts
When an attorney holding funds for a client places them into an interest-bearing
account, 29 a fundamental question arises: to whom does the interest earned belong?
An attorney and her client are free to enter into an agreement concerning how interest
earned on trust funds will be treated. In the absence of such an agreement, however,
the position of the ABA is that interest earned on a client's trust funds belongs to the
Kan. 183, 660 P.2d 567 (1983) (public censure); In re Witte, 615 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1981), reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1165
(1982) (disbarment). The ABA notes that "[b]ecause lawyers who commingle client's funds with their own subject the
client's funds to the claims of creditors, . . . a period of suspension is appropriate even in cases when the client does not
suffer a loss." See SAscnoN STNanRos, supra note 13, Standard 4.12 commentary.
21. See infra section III.C.
22. See, e.g., State er rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Statmore, 218 Neb. 138, 142-43, 352 N.W.2d 875, 878
(1984) ("[Ploor accounting procedures and sloppy office management are not excuses or mitigating circumstances in
reference to commingled funds."). See also In re Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491, 494, 652 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1982); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Boehm, 293 Md. 476, 481, 446 A.2d 52, 54 (1982).
23. MOD. RutLas, supra note 3, Rule 1.15(c); MoE. COD, supra note 3, DR 9-102(A)(2).
24. See Comment, Attorney Misappropriation of Client Funds, 27 HowARD L.J. 1597, 1600-01 (1984); see also
Sobelson, Trust Account Rules for Georgia Lawyers, GA. ST. B.J., Aug. 1987, at 22,25 ("Obviously, the key to avoiding
problems here is effective communication with the client.").
25. MODEL COn, supra note 3, DR 9-102(B)(3).
26. MODEL RuLss, supra note 3, Rule 1.15(a).
27. See, e.g., MAss. COD O' PROF. Rasp. DR 9-102(B)(3) (West 1987) (ten years); N.H. RtLs oF PROF. CoND. Rule
1.15(a)(2) (1987) (six years); N.J. RuE 1:21-6(b) (West 1987) (seven years); Wis. Sup. CT. RuL.s SCR 20:1.15(e) (1987)
(six years).
28. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
29. In some situations, the fiduciary duty of the attorney holding client funds may call for the placing of funds into
an interest-bearing account. For example, "where the amount of funds held for a specific client and the expected holding
period make it obvious that the interest which would be earned would exceed the lawyer's administrative costs and the
bank charges, the lawyer should consult the client and follow the client's instructions as to investing." ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982).
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client. 30 Thus, where no agreement is reached, failure to remit to clients the interest
earned on trust funds constitutes an ethical violation. 31
"Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account" programs (often referred to as "IOLTA"
or "IOTA" programs), however, provide an exception to the general rule. 32 While
the details of these programs vary among jurisdictions, the fundamental concept of
each is the same. Certain trust funds held by an attorney, generally those nominal in
amount or held for a short term, are to be deposited in an interest-bearing account. 33
Where no agreement exists between the attorney and the client with respect to interest
earned on the funds, the interest is to be remitted to the state bar or to a fund
administered by the state. The interest is then used for a variety of programs, such as
Clients' Security Funds or legal aid societies.
The ABA has taken the position that compliance with a state's IOLTA
requirements is not a violation of an attorney's ethical duties respecting his client's
funds.3 4 This opinion was in part based on case law which held that such programs
did not involve a "taking" of client property. 35 The constitutionality of IOLTA
programs has been recently upheld in the Eleventh Circuit. 36
In states in which IOLTA programs are mandatory, attorneys must participate or
risk disciplinary action. Even where programs are voluntary, however, participation
is encouraged. IOLTA programs provide funds for important public interest activi-
ties. 37 Interest earned on funds subject to IOLTA may be minimal in an individual
case, but an aggregation of the interest statewide can be quite considerable. Using
these funds for the public good will help to enhance the reputation of the profession
as the public recognizes that attorneys are responsive to the needs of their
community. 38 This will in turn better enable the profession to preserve public
confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice.
30. See id., in which the Committee state its opinion that "the Model Code does not permit the lawyer to use
interest earned on client funds to defray the lawyer's own operating expenses without the specific and informed consent
of the client."
31. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Dancu, 490 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1986) (attorney suspended for six months and required
to pass the ethics portion of the Multistate Bar Exam for failing to remit to a client interest earned on the client's funds
and lying to client that no such interest was earned.
32. See generally Note, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts-Legal Issues and the Kansas Program, 33 U. KAN.
L. Rsv. 145 (1984). As of June, 1986, nearly all states had adopted an IOLTA program, and several states had decided
that compliance with the IOLTA requirements would be mandatory (Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio,
Washington, and Wisconsin). See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 45:202-05 (1986). Since then other states
have joined in adopting a mandatory program. See, e.g., Mirm. Rutrs oF PeOF. Rasp. AND CAioNs DR 9-102(C) (1987).
33. See, e.g., Oino Ray. CODE ANN. § 4705.09(A)(I) (Page 1987). When larger amounts, or long-term holdings,
are involved, an agreement between the attorney and the client with respect to interest to be earned is much more likely
to exist. See supra note 29. Attorneys are given broad discretion in determining which funds held are subject to the IOLTA
requirements. See, e.g., Oo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4705.09(A)(3) (Page 1987); Wis. Sup. Cr. Ruas SCR 20:1.15(c)(4)
(1987).
34. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982).
35. Id. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). For a list of decisions from the Supreme
Courts of other states holding to the same effect, see Cone v. State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002, 1006 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding
Florida's IOTA program constitutional).
36. Cone v. State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
37. See Morgenstern, IOLTA: "Interest on Lmyer Trust Accounts" Funding of Legal Aid in Ohio, 58 Ono ST.
B.A. REP. 852, at 854 (1985).
38. See Hill, A Blank Check for the Public Good, 56 FLA. B.J. 95 (Feb. 1982); cf. Comment, Maine's IOLTA
Proposal: A Source of Supplemental Funding for Legal Services, 36 MAm L. Ray. 359, 373-75 (1984).
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B. Duty to Report Ethical Violations
The Model Rules require that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer
has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects, shall inform the appropriate authority. "39 Some commentators have
taken the view that this facet of professional self-regulation is more theoretical than
real, noting that in practice lawyers will more likely than not fail to report ethical
violations. 40 Especially troubling is the thought that attorneys may be reluctant even
to report the misappropriation of funds by other attorneys. Until all attorneys take this
ethical duty seriously, the public's trust in the legal profession as a self-regulating
profession will remain at risk.
m1. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Preventing the Mishandling of Client Property
The responsibility of preserving client property rests in the hands of both
individual attorneys and the legal profession itself. An attorney who mishandles client
funds will be the first to lose that client's trust. However, the response of the legal
profession to any misconduct will also be scrutinized closely by the public. Thus, a
combined effort of individual attorneys and the bar is necessary to prevent the misuse
of client property and thereby maintain the public's trust in the legal profession.
First, practicing attorneys must be well educated in the rules regarding client
funds and the mechanics of maintaining a trust account. Several state bar associations
have responded by publishing guidelines to assist attorneys in complying with the
ethical rules.41 Commingling often occurs simply because an attorney maintains only
one account for both personal and trust funds. Loss of a client's funds in such a
situation can easily occur even where there is no intent to misuse the client's funds.
Strict compliance with the trust account rules can easily avoid such loss and the
severe sanctions likely to accompany it. For example, in In re Fleischer, a
three-member firm was using its trust account to pay both trust and operating expense
obligations.42 An auditor found that the trust account had twenty-four instances of
overdrafts in a two-month period, which the court considered an invasion of specific
clients' funds.43 This breach of the trust account requirements resulted in temporary
loss to the clients and the disbarment of all three attorneys.
39. MODEL Ruos, supra note 3, Rule 8.3(a) (emphasis added). See also MODEL CoE, supra note 3, DR 1-103.
40. See Soule, supra note 5, at 421 n.41.
41. See, e.g., Bell, Trust Accounts, 56 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 192 (1983); Kurzer, Coleman, Leiter & Trager,
Attorneys' Trust Accounts-Rules and Pilfalls, 55 FLA. B.J. 355 (1981); Ringuette, You and Your Trust Fund Account,
6 CAL. LAw. 29 (Oct. 1986); Sobelson, supra note 24; see also Slater, Handling Client Funds: Honesty Isn't Enough, Nat'l
L.J., June 28, 1982, at 20, col. 1. Other means of education, including law school, bar admissions requirement, and
continuing legal education should also be utilized. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 561-63.
42. In re Fleischer, 102 N.J. 440, 508 A.2d 1115 (1986).
43. Id. at 442, 508 A.2d at 1116. The Supreme Court of California has followed similar reasoning: "'The mere fact
that the balance in an attorney's trust account has fallen below the total of amounts deposited in and purportedly held in
trust, supports a conclusion of misappropriation." Giovanazzi v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 619 P.2d 1005, 1009,
169 Cal. Rptr. 581, 585-86 (1980).
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Second, the profession must actively police trust accounts. It has long been
argued that all attorney trust accounts should be subject to annual audits. 44 A few
states have required attorneys to complete certificates of compliance or have
established random audit programs, both of which reportedly have been successful in
ensuring compliance with the trust account rules and, thus, in protecting client
funds. 45 The programs serve several functions: discovery of any improprieties before
damage is done to a client through purposeful or inadvertent conversion; strict
enforcement of the trust fund requirements; and effective deterrence through an
effective fact-finding procedure .46 Adoption of these programs in all states would be
a sign to the public of the profession's commitment to see that all client property will
be protected when in an attorney's charge.
B. Compensating Victims of Attorney Misconduct
In some situations an attorney already will have reimbursed the client for any
loss suffered before any disciplinary action is initiated. However, a client whose
funds are misappropriated may often be left only with the recourse of a civil suit
against the attorney. Most states have responded to this obvious inequity by
establishing a Clients' Security Fund into which attorneys pay periodic dues and out
of which injured clients are compensated. 47 Unfortunately, because many of the
funds do not have adequate financial resources, injured clients are often not fully
compensated.
Disciplinary bodies must be cognizant that injured clients may not be fully
reimbursed by the Clients' Security Fund. In such cases, where a client suffers
compensable injury, the attorney causing the injury should be required to see that the
victim is compensated in full before the attorney is permitted to resume practice. 48
Moreover, where the Clients' Security Fund has compensated an injured client, the
fund should require full reimbursement from the individual attorney involved. 49
These requirements, coupled with a continuing effort to increase the financial
resources of Clients' Security Fund Programs, hopefully will ensure that injured
clients will be fully compensated.50
44. See, e.g., ABA S1aA. Comm. ON EvALUAoON OF DcwuasRY ENmRnmAENr, PROBLAs AND REco.mmumATONs iN
Dt.cAMtY ENORcDaEr 173 (Final Draft 1970), cited in Johnson, supra note 8, at 548 n.463; Manahan, Lawyers Should
Be Audited, 59 A.B.A. J. 396 (1973); Soule, supra note 5, at 441.
45. See Couric, Random Audit of Trust Accounts, 72 A.B.A. J. 70 (Oct. 1986). See also Johnson, supra note 8,
at 546-49, discussing the effectiveness of New Jersey's Random Audit Program: "It educates the bar by pointing out
individual deficiencies while at the same time acts as a deterrent for a portion of that small percentage of attorneys who
may be tempted to steal."
46. See Soule, supra note 5, at 440-45.
47. See id. at 423-30; see also Palermo, Clients' Security Funds Help Our Professional Image, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J.
10 (Oct. 1984).
48. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Van Sharman, 504 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1987) (attorney disbarred for three years and
"required to pay restitution and costs . . . prior to seeking readmission. ... ). See also ABA STrNARDs FOR LAwYER
DLua 7E Ara Ds sas PIocEsrncs Standard 6.12 (1983) [hereinafter Dmsn'lr STaas]. Cf. In re Stafford, 106 N.M.
298, - , 742 P.2d 510, 511 (1987) ("Where one is unable financially to make restitution, full payment might not
necessarily be a precondition for reinstatement.").
49. See ABA MODEL Rtuzs to, Cumers' Stcusrrv Futos Rule 15 (1981).
50. As noted above, it must unfortunately be recognized that funds are limited and not all victims of attorney
misconduct can be compensated. The ABA suggests that Clients' Security Funds set a maximum per claimant of $10,000
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C. Discipline of Attorneys Who Knowingly Misuse Client Funds
The profession's primary method of self-regulation is the disciplinary system. As
noted earlier, it is generally recognized that in determining whether and to what extent
to discipline an attorney, the principal concern is "the protection of the public,
preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the highest
possible standards for attorneys." 51 An attorney who has misused funds has already
lost the trust of at least one client. At this point attention turns to the bar as it decides
what sanctions are appropriate. Specifically, the question presented in each case is:
Does the disciplinary system impose sanctions consistently and with sufficient severity
to deter future misconduct and hence provide maximum protection to the public?
Generally, professional misconduct can result in sanctions ranging from a private
letter of reprimand to a revocation of the license to practice law. While the primary
factor in determining appropriate discipline is the type of misconduct involved, various
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are also considered.5 2 Among the mitigating
factors specifically considered in misappropriation cases are restitution, 53 a prior
unblemished disciplinary record, 54 evidence of good character, 55 a showing of re-
morse, 56 and a showing of severe personal problems.57 Aggravating factors generally
include failure to make restitution, 58 the existence of prior disciplinary infractions, 59
the occurrence of other misconduct at the time of the misconduct giving rise to the
disciplinary action, 60 and the lack of a showing of remorse. 61
for each instance of misconduct and $200,000 aggregate recovery. ABA MoDEL RuIS FoR C~m:?' Sscuxrry FuNDs Rule
12 and Comment (1981). However, it also emphasizes that "[flull reimbursement is the goal of a clients' security
fund."Id.
51. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
52. These mitigating factors are listed in SAscnoN STANDA.os, supra note 13, Standard 9.32:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(0) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
0) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
53. See, e.g., In re Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491, 493, 652 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452,457,714 P.2d 1239, 1242,224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Louisana State Bar Ass'n v. Perez, 471 So. 2d 685, 689 (La. 1985).
56. See, e.g., In re Webb, 105 fIl. 2d 360, 365, 475 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1985).
57. See, e.g., In re Cutrone, 112 Ill. 2d 261, 269, 492 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (1986).
58. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Zinzell, 387 So. 2d 346, 349 (Fla. 1980).
59. See, e.g., People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879, 881 (Colo. 1982).
60. A single act of misconduct may involve a number of ethical violations. While each violation may be relatively
minor, the fact that several violations occurred may warrant severe discipline. For example, in In re Math, 113 A.D.2d
212, 495 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1985), an attorney was suspended for three years for neglecting duties and obligations in
representing a client; deceiving the client as to settlement of her action; tendering a check which was returned for
insufficient funds; falling to reply to client's correspondence; neglecting a matter entrusted by another client; permitting
the statute of limitations to expire; and falling to cooperate with the grievance committees.
61. See, e.g., Stanley v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 640 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tenn. 1982).
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This section of the Comment addresses the discipline imposed for the knowing
misappropriation of client funds, 62 focusing on two primary issues: the degree of
discipline deemed appropriate and the consistency with which it is imposed. The
ABA has noted that "[i]nappropriate sanctions can undermine the goals of lawyer
discipline: sanctions which are too lenient fail to adequately deter misconduct and
thus lower public confidence in the profession; sanctions which are too onerous may
impair confidence in the system and deter lawyers from reporting ethical violations
on the part of other lawyers." 63 Further, "[i]nconsistent sanctions, either within a
jurisdiction or among jurisdictions, cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness
of all disciplinary systems. "64
1. Disbarment as the Appropriate Sanction
It has been stated that "[m]isappropriation of a client's property constitutes a
serious violation of professional ethics and of general morality, likely to endanger the
public confidence in the legal profession. ' 65 The New Jersey Supreme Court stated
the case simply: "The attorney has stolen his clients' money. No clearer wrong
suffered by a client at the hands of one he had every reason to trust can be
imagined." 66 Considering the egregiousness of this type of misconduct, courts have
62. Misappropriation is not the only type of misconduct involving client funds. Others include commingling funds,
failing to keep adequate records, failing to notify the client of the receipt of funds, and failing to promptly deliver funds
to which the client is entitled. However, this Comment analyzes discipline for misappropriation only for several reasons:
misappropriation is generally recognized as one of the most egregious forms of attorney misconduct; the client is likely
to have suffered loss due to misappropriation and thus the profession's efforts to protect the client have failed; and the
discipline imposed for misappropriation varies so significantly within and among jurisidictions.
Moreover, this Comment limits the examination of discipline for misappropriation to those cases where the attorney
was found to have knowingly misused client funds. In some cases knowledge may be inferred, as when an attorney
commingles his business and trust funds and the balance in the account falls below the amount supposedly held in trust.
See supra note 43. However, in other cases attorneys have misused client funds with full knowledge that their client would
suffer as a result of their ethical violation. No more serious breach of a client's trust can be imagined, and no situation
calls for a more severe and consistent disciplinary response.
It is also recognized that misappropriation is technically not a violation of Rule 1.15. That rule does not specifically
address misappropriation. Rather, the actual prohibition against misappropriation is found in Rule 8.4, which deems it
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
MoDs. Rus.rs, supra note 3, Rule 8.4(c); see also MoDEm CODE, supra note 3, DR 1-102(A)(4). See Dubin & Schwartz,
Survey and Analysis of Michigan's Disciplinary System for Lawyers, 61 U. DEsmorr J. URB. L. 1, 55 (1983).
63. SANscnoN SrTANDos, supra note 13, Preface.
64. Id. See also In re Grant, 89 ll. 2d 247, 262, 433 N.E.2d 259, 267 (1982) (Moran, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 838 (1982) ("[Allthough it is necessary to consider the facts and circumstances of each case, that proposition
should not be used as an aegis to attenuate the always strived-for goal of consistency.").
65. Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452, 457, 714 P.2d 1239, 1242, 224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 103 (1986).
66. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 456, 409 A.2d 1153, 1155 (1979). As another court has noted:
The very nature of the practice of law requires that clients place their lives, their money, and their causes in the
hands of their lawyers with a degree of blind trust that is paralleled in very few other economic relationships.
Our primary purpose in the disciplinary process is to assure that the public can repose this trust in confidence.
The direct violation of this trust by stealing a client's money, compounded by lying about it, mandates a
punishment commensurate with such abuse.
Florida Bar v. Dancu, 490 So. 2d 40, 41-42 (Fla. 1986).
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held that disbarment is usually the appropriate sanction, 67 and the ABA supports this
view.6 8
2. Current Inconsistencies in Discipline Imposed
Recognizing first that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for misappropria-
tion of client funds, the actual practice of attorney discipline must be evaluated in
terms of the consistency with which this sanction is applied. First, it is generally
recognized that attorney discipline "does not have as its objective the punishment of
the offending lawyer," and that the proper discipline to be imposed "should be
determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of all the circumstances. "69 A
wide variety of mitigating circumstances generally are recognized in cases of
misappropriation.70 These mitigating circumstances naturally lead to differences in
discipline imposed. In cases of knowing misuse of funds, however, giving undue
weight to mitigating circumstances is inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of
the disciplinary system-to protect the public and to preserve public confidence in the
administration of justice. 71 Thus, in considering discipline imposed for misappropri-
ation of funds, the mitigating factors frequently recognized must be evaluated to
determine if their consideration will truly protect the public.7 2
a. Restitution
In many cases, an attorney will be given a more lenient sanction because she has
made restitution. For example, in Louisiana State Bar Association v. Hinrichs, an
attorney received a $14,185 workers' compensation settlement on behalf of his
client.73 Because of a check Hinrichs had previously drawn on his trust account and
postdated, the check issued to the client was returned for insufficient funds. Theclient
was forced to hire another lawyer to sue Hinrichs for the workers' compensation
settlement and damages. The client and Hinrichs eventually compromised, and
67. See, e.g., In re Couser, 122 Ariz. 500, 502, 596 P.2d 26, 28 (1979); Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452,
457, 714 P.2d 1239, 1242, 224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 103 (1986); In re Wade, 526 A.2d 936, 939 (D.C. 1987); In re Bizar,
97 MI. 2d 127, 132, 454 N.E.2d 271, 273 (1983); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599, 609, 441 A.2d
328, 333 (1982); In re Disciplinary Action Against Simonson, 365 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1985); Connolly's Case, 127
N.H. 786, 789-90, 508 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1986); In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 455, 409 A.2d 1153, 1155 (1979); Carter
v. Ross, 461 A.2d 675, 676 (R.I. 1983); In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 76, 614 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1980).
68. See ScnoN STANARDs, supra note 13, Standard 4.11.
69. In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 76, 614 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1980). "The court should avoid adoption of rules
that mandate dispositions for certain forms of misconduct. Fixed penalties limit the court's ability to deal with the
complexity and variety of circumstances involved in each matter." DiscimiN SmTmDAss, supra note 48, Standard 7.1
commentary.
70. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. "The modest discipline of public censure the court imposes [in
this case of commingling and misappropriation] threatens the public's respect for the legal profession and will impair the
public's confidence in this court's regulation of the bar." In re Deragon, 398 Mass. 127, 133-34, 495 N.E.2d 831, 834
(1986) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
72. The following discussion will focus on mitigating factors solely in the context of disciplinary actions for
knowing misappropriation. It is recognized that this analysis may be more generally applied to the consideration of
mitigating factors in cases of other attorney misconduct. However, this broader application is generally beyond the scope
of this Comment.
73. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hinrichs, 475 So. 2d 749 (La. 1985).
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Hinrichs paid the client $3,500 in damages as well as the balance of the workers'
compensation award. 74 The court found that Hinrichs had indeed "commingled and
converted his client's funds to his own use," 75 and noted that "in such cases
long-term suspension or disbarment can be warTanted. '"76 However, the court
concluded that because Hinrichs "had completed full restitution, ' 77 it would refrain
from "applying the most extreme remedies." 7 8 Hinrichs was suspended for twenty-
four months. 79 Other states have given similar weight to restitution as a mitigating
factor, noting that in such cases the most severe discipline is not warranted as the
client has suffered no actual loss. 80
Some courts have refused to adopt this view of restitution. In In re Wilson, the
New Jersey Supreme Court found the attorney guilty of two counts of misappropri-
ation, involving $23,000 and $4,300 respectively. 8' Wilson had returned the funds as
to the first count, which raised the question of restitution as a mitigating factor. The
court refused to give any weight to restitution, noting that while "[r]estitution may
compensate an individual complainant for the financial loss suffered, ' 8 2 its existence
fails to "significantly retard the subtle but progressive erosion of public confidence
in the integrity of the bench and bar. "83 The court further found that giving any
weight to restitution "creates the impression that sanctions are proportioned in
accordance with ability to pay, rather than gauged against the seriousness of the
misconduct." 84 After rejecting other mitigating factors,8 5 Wilson was disbarred.8 6
In considering the disciplinary system as a whole, it seems the proper approach
is somewhere between these two extremes. As noted earlier, the disciplinary process
must be concerned with compensating the injured client as well as with preventing
future misconduct.8 7 Even the Wilson decision recognized that "refusal to consider
restitution in this class of cases removes an incentive for compensation of injured
parties. '"88 However, relying on the effectiveness of programs such as Clients'
74. Id. at 749-50.




79. Id. at 752. This result was reached despite the facts that no other mitigating circumstances were present, and
that Hinrichs had been subject to at least sixteen prior complaints, four of which resulted in private or public reprimand.
Id. at 751-52.
80. See, e.g., In re Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491, 493, 652 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1982) (attorney suspended for one year);
Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452, 459, 714 P.2d 1239, 1244, 244 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105 (1986) (attorney suspended
for six months); Florida Bar v. Kent, 484 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1986) (attorney suspended for three years); In re Bizar,
97 111. 2d 127, 132, 454 N.E.2d 271,273 (1983) (attorney suspended for one year); In re Deragon, 398 Mass. 127, 132,
495 N.E.2d 831, 833-34 (1986) (attorney receives public censure).
81. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 453, 409 A.2d 1153, 1154 (1979).
82. Id. at 458, 409 A.2d at 1156.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 459, 409 A.2d at 1156-57. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma also found this concern sufficient to warrant
refusal to consider resitituion as a mitigating factor. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 267
(Okla. 1982).
85. The Wilson decision's views of other mitigating circumstances are discussed infra notes 100-01, 121, and 135
and accompanying text.
86. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 461, 409 A.2d 1153, 1158 (1979).
87. See supra section II.B.
88. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 459, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157 (1970). Whether encouraging restitution is worth the
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Security Funds, 89 the Wilson court declared that "[fjrom this point of view,
compensation of injured parties should not be deemed an appropriate function of our
disciplinary process.'9 Even if Clients' Security Funds are provided with nearly
unlimited resources, such a blanket statement seems unjustified. 91
However, this is not to say that restitution alone should be sufficient to warrant
a sanction more lenient than disbarment. One must recognize that "[tihe mere
circumstance of restitution is likely to be fortuitous and to depend upon conditions
and circumstances that afford no reliable test of a person's moral fitness as a
lawyer.''92 Remembering that leniency lowers public confidence in professional
self-regulation, 93 courts should be reluctant to deviate from the normally appropriate
sanction of disbarment when restitution is the only mitigating factor present. Thus, to
accommodate the numerous competing objectives of the disciplinary process, it
seems that the best course is to consider restitution as a mitigating factor, but not to
make its consideration outcome determinative. A sanction other than disbarment
should be imposed only where other significant mitigating circumstances are shown.
This would preserve the incentive to make restitution without wholly sacrificing the
desired goal of consistency.
Before closing this discussion of restitution, it is necessary to distinguish
between restitution made before any action is taken against the attorney and that made
when the attorney is under pressure of a civil suit or ethics investigation. Restitution
made of the attorney's own volition, before any action is brought, shows intent not
to injure the individual client and should be analyzed as above. However, when the
attorney does not repay the funds until forced to do so, the policies behind the
consideration of restitution are even less compelling. Some states have explicitly
made this distinction, 94 and the ABA favors the approach of not considering
restitution that is made after an action is commenced as a mitigating factor. 95
b. Prior Unblemished Record
The absence of prior misconduct may weigh heavily in an attorney's favor. In
State Bar v. Geralds, an attorney was charged with several acts of misconduct,
including failing to preserve the identity of a client's funds, commingling a client's
risk of decreased deterrence is a question not easily resolved. See Soule, supra note 5, at 421 n.40, where the author
argues that "[b]y withholding discipline when restitution is made, the ethical standards of the profession are not
maintained and the confidence of the public is diminished."
89. See generally, supra section II.B.
90. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 459 n.3, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157 n.3 (1979).
91. The ABA favors the approach of considering restitution as a mitigating factor. "Such a policy will encourage
lawyers to make restitution, reducing the degree of injury to the client and helping insure that the lawyer has recognized
the wrongfulness of his conduct." S~Acrrou STAsN ARs, supra note 13, Standard 9.3 commentary. "Whenever possible,
the disciplinary process should facilitate restitution to the victims of the respondent's misconduct without requiring victims
to institute separate proceedings at their own expense." Dsc.mE SrsDANmos, supra note 48, Standard 6.12 commentary.
92. State ex rel. Oklahoma State Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 267 (Okla. 1982). See also In re Salvesen,
94 Wash. 2d 73, 86, 614 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1980) (Stafford, J., dissenting).
93. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Smiley v. Board of Commn'rs, 286 Ala. 216, 230, 238 So. 2d 716, 730 (1970); Disciplinary Bd. v.
Kim, 59 Haw. 449, 454, 583 P.2d 333, 337 (1978); In re Stewart, 104 N.M. 337, 340, 721 P.2d 405, 408 (1986).
95. SANCInoN SmTADaRns, supra note 13, Standard 9.4(a).
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funds, and using a client's funds for his own gain without the client's permission. 96
The hearing panel had recommended disbarment, and the State Bar Grievance Board
issued an order permanently revoking Geralds' license. 97 On appeal, the Michigan
Supreme Court reduced the severity of the discipline from permanent disbarment to
a three-year suspension, "[i]n light of Mr. Geralds' 'perviously unblemished record'
as well as the totality of circumstances surrounding the relationship between Geralds
and [the] client ... ."98 Other states have given this factor similar consideration in
misappropriation cases. 99
Not all courts, however, have adopted this view. The New Jersey Supreme
Court found that "the prior outstanding career.... often considered a mitigating
factor in disciplinary matters, seems less important to us where misappropriation is
involved. . . . [T]o distinguished practitioners, its grievousness should be even
clearer."' ° As for the argument that a prior unblemished record is evidence of an
intent to avoid future misconduct, the court deemed "the unlikelihood of subsequent
misappropriation irrelevant in these cases." 10' Some commentators have argued that
an unblemished record "[is inappropriate as mitigation when the offense involves
dishonesty."'' 0 2 At best it is entitled to some minimal weight, but it should never by
itself justify a sanction other than disbarment.
c. Remorse or Admission of Guilt
A more lenient sanction may be imposed where the attorney admits her mis-
conduct and shows that she is truly sorry for what she has done. This was the case
in In re Webb, where an attorney was found to have converted more than $400 of his
client's money. 10 3 Despite the fact that the attorney had never made restitution, he was
not disbarred. In suspending the attorney for two years and conditioning reinstatement
on the making of restitution, the Illinois Supreme Court noted: "He admits his
misconduct. He acknowledges that he erred. He wants to make restitution. We think,
under the circumstances of this case, the respondent should not be disbarred." '04
96. In re Geralds, 402 Mich. 387, 389, 263 N.W.2d 241, 242 (1978).
97. Id. at 388, 263 N.W.2d at 241.
98. Id. at 391, 263 N.W.2d at 243. For a discussion of other issues involved in Geralds, see Dubin & Schwartz,
supra note 62, at 52-53.
99. See, e.g., In re Bums, 139 Ariz. 487, 493, 679 P.2d 510, 516 (1984) (attorney suspended for one year);
Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452, 457, 714 P.2d 1239, 1242, 224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105 (1986) (attorney suspended
for six months); Florida Bar v. Perri, 435 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 1983) (attorney suspended for three years); In re Young,
111 IIl. 2d 98, 104,488 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (1986) (attorney receives public censure); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Perez,
471 So. 2d 685, 689 (La. 1985) (attorney suspended for 18 months); In re Deragon, 398 Mass. 127, 133, 495 N.E.2d
831, 834 (1986) (attorney receives public censure);In re Walton, 251 N.W.2d 762, 764 (N.D. 1977) (attorney suspended
for six months); In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 77, 614 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1980) (attorney suspended for two years).
100. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 459-60, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157 (1979).
101. Id. at 460 n.4, 409 A.2d at 115 n.4. After noting that the unlikelihood of recurrence alone would never be
sufficient to warrant lesser discipline, the court reasoned that "[t]o state that we might nevertheless consider it 'but only
in conjunction with other factors' falsely attributes importance to a factor almost universally present in these matters."
Id. Accord State ex rel. Oklahoma bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 268 (Okla. 1982). Cf. In re Bums, 139 Ariz. 487,
493, 679 P.2d 510, 516 (1984) (attorney suspended for one year rather than disbarred, in light of the fact that it did not
"appear that the respondent [was] likely to repeat his past misconduct.").
102. Dubin & Schwartz, supra note 62, at 28.
103. In re Webb, 105 IlL. 2d 360, 364, 475 N.E.2d 523, 524 (1985).
104. Id. at 365, 475 N.E.2d at 525.
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The rationale behind considering remorse as a mitigating factor appears to be the
recognition of a connection between remorse and an intent not to engage in the
misconduct in the future.1 0 5 In Waysman v. State Bar, the California Supreme Court
suspended an attorney for six months for misappropriating $24,000 belonging to his
client. 10 6 Among the mitigating factors considered in imposition of this lenient
sanction was the attorney's remorse. The court noted that the attorney's "immediate
acknowledgement of his wrongdoing and his prompt efforts to see restitution was
made suggest that the offense was atypical."' 1 7 Other jurisdictions have taken a
similar view of an attorney's showing of remorse in misappropriation cases.103 The
ABA supports this view.'°9
Closely associated with an attorney's showing of remorse is her willingness to
cooperate with the ethics committee investigating her alleged misappropriation. Some
states have held that when the attorney fully and willingly cooperates, this fact should
be considered in her favor in determining the appropriate discipline. 1 0 As with
remorse, consideration of a cooperative attitude relies on a connection between
recognition of prior wrongdoing and an intention to avoid such misconduct in the
future. The ABA has also approved of the consideration of this factor."'
In considering remorse and cooperation as mitigating, however, the courts
should be careful not to give these factors undue weight. Cooperation is itself an
ethical requirement,"12 the breach of which may give rise to disciplinary action." 3
Failure to cooperate may also be a significant aggravating circumstance in a
misappropriation case.114 Further, a showing of remorse is as likely to be motivated
simply by a desire to return to practice as by a true acceptance of the gravity of the
misconduct."I5 Thus, it seems that in general a showing of contrition or a willingness
to cooperate should have very little, if any, effect on the discipline imposed.
105. See, e.g., In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 614 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1980) ("His demonstrated ability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the profession, along with his expressions of contrition, are certainly factors
we must take into account.").
106. Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452, 455, 714 P.2d 1239, 1241, 224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 102 (1986).
107. Id. at 459, 714 P.2d at 1244, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
108. Florida Bar v. Perri, 435 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 1983) (attorney suspended for three years); In re Discipline of
Gubbins, 380 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. 1986) (attorney suspended for four months); Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland v.
Sanders, 24 Ohio St. 3d 5, 6, 492 N.E.2d 449, 450 (1986) (attorney suspended for one year).
109. SAscnov SrmAwsas, supra note 13, Standard 9.32(1).
110. See, e.g., McCray v. State Bar, 38 Cal. 3d 257, 274, 696 P.2d 83, 94, 211 Cal. Rptr. 691, 701 (1985)
(attorney suspended for six months); Florida Bar v. Kent, 484 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1986) (attorney suspended for three
years); In re Deragon, 398 Mass. 127, 133, 495 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1986) (attorney receives public censure); In re Shaw,
298 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1980) (attorney receives public reprimand); In re Noble, 100 Wash. 2d 88, 93, 667 P.2d
608, 611 (1983) (attorney suspended for 90 days).
111. SANcnox STAARs, supra note 13, Standard 9.32(e).
112. See MODEL Rutsts, supra note 3, Rule 8.4(d), which deems it misconduct for an attorney to "engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." See also a similar provision in MODEL COD, supra note 3, DR
1-102(A)(5).
113. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Stienstra, 390 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1986) (attorney
issued a public reprimand for failure to cooperate); In re Wanderman, 100 A.D.2d 309, 474 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1984)
(attorney receives public reprimand for failure to cooperate).
114. See, e.g., In re Stillo, 68 I11. 2d 49, 55, 368 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1977) (attorney disbarred).
115. See In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 86, 614 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1980) (Stafford, J., dissenting).
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d. Other Mitigating Factors
An attorney may receive a lesser sanction where he can present uncontested
testimony concerning his good character. 1 6 Evidence that the attorney enjoys a good
reputation in the community may also be considered. 117 In evaluating these factors,
one should first note that any testimony of good character will .obviously be
inconsistent with the seriousness of the misconduct. Hence, its consideration seems
entitled to little, if any, weight. Reputation evidence, however, has been found
relevant depending on what is presented. Since protection of the public is the primary
goal, it can be argued that reputation evidence will bear on the question of what
protection the public needs if that evidence is based on the attorney's reputation in
light of the misconduct. The argument follows that unless the attorney can show that
her misconduct is widely known in the community, evidence of her reputation is not
sufficiently reliable for a disciplinary body or a court to consider.1" 8 However, it
seems the best policy is not to consider any reputation evidence as mitigating,
because a public willing to trust an attorney known to have misused funds seems to
need even greater protection.
Some states have held that the personal problems of the attorney may mitigate
severe discipline. Such problems may include financial difficulties, 1' 9 as well as
marital break-up or other family difficulties. 120 Whether this approach adequately
protects the public is debatable at best. While failure to consider the attorney's
problems may seem harsh, "the sympathy engendered by the impossible plight of the
attorney which caused him to steal is offset by the fact that he did so, most often,
without regard for the possibility that he might be inflicting the same misery, or
worse, on his innocent client."' 12 In imposing sanctions for misappropriation, the
court should not base its decision in part on whether the attorney needed the money
or not. Such an approach runs contrary to the notion that a client's funds are inviolate,
and, in essence, tells attorneys that their client's funds are inviolate unless they really
need them. It seems the best approach, then, is not to consider the attorney's financial
or personal problems as mitigating. 122
116. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Perez, 471 So. 2d 685, 689 (La. 1985) (attorney suspended for 18 months); see
also In re Disciplinary Action Against Simonson, 365 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1985) (attorney receives public censure).
117. See, e.g., In re Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491, 494, 652 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1982) (attorney suspended for one year);
Florida Bar v. Kent, 484 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1986) (attorney suspended for three years); In re Bizar, 97 Ill. 2d 127,
132, 454 N.E.2d 271, 273 (1983) (attorney suspended for one year); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Perez, 471 So. 2d 685,
689 (La. 1985) (attorney suspended for 18 months); In re Shaw, 298 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1980) (attorney receives
public reprimand); In re Walton, 251 N.W.2d 762, 764 (N.D. 1977) (attorney suspended for six months).
118. See, e.g., In re Salvesen, 94 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 614 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1980).
119. See, e.g., Smith v. State Bar, 37 Cal. 3d 17, 25, 687 P.2d 259, 263,206 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (1984) (attorney
receives four-year stayed suspension and is placed on four-year probation); In re Cutrone, 112 I11. 2d 261, 269, 492
N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (1986) (attorney suspended for two years).
120. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kagawa, 63 Haw. 150, 158-59, 622 P.2d 115, 121 (1981)
(attorney suspended for four years); In re Cutrone, 112 Ill. 2d 261, 269, 492 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (1986) (attorney
suspended for two years).
121. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 461 n.6, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157 n.6 (1979); accord State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n
v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 268 (Okla. 1982).
122. Cf. SANcnos; STANDARsS, upra note 13, Standard 9.32(c).
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However, this approach may go too far, since the term "personal problems"
encompasses a wide variety of circumstances that may suggest a need for special
treatment. For example, the dilemma of alcohol dependency is one that deserves a
well-reasoned approach. The legal profession has long been forced to recognize the
prevalence of this problem among attorneys, and in recent years various efforts have
been made to assist and rehabilitate those who suffer from alcoholism. 123 The
troubling question is in determining to what extent alcoholism should bear on the
outcome of attorney disciplinary proceedings. 124 In Attorney Grievance Commission
v. Willemain, the Maryland Court of Appeals states that "[b]ut for the fact that
alcohol has been found to be at the root of Willemain's problem and thus that he was
not his own master, we would disbar him without hesitation." 1 2 5 In Waysman v. State
Bar, the California Supreme Court considered as mitigating the fact that the attorney
had made considerable efforts to overcome his alcohol problem. 126 Other states have
considered alcoholism as a mitigating factor in these contexts. 127
Alcoholism , however, is not universally considered a mitigating factor. In Carter
v. Ross, an attorney misappropriated over $30,000 from the estate of a client, using
some of the funds to "reimburse another client" 128 and the balance "to pay the
expenses involved in maintaining his law office and his family." 129 Ross offered as
a mitigating factor the fact that "he had recently finally accepted the fact that he was
an alcoholic." 130 While the court wished him well in his rehabilitation, it nevertheless
ordered disbarment, noting that the court has an overriding "responsibility of doing
everything within reason to safeguard a client's funds from an unfit attorney, whatever
the cause of his unfitness may be." ' 131 This result seems harsh, and cannot be
reconciled with the views of other courts discussed above. The legal profession should
be attentive to alcohol-related problems. 132 Indeed, refusing to consider alcohol
123. See, e.g., Blodgett, Helping Alcoholic Lawyers, 72 A.B.A. J. 22 (Nov. 1986); Morley, Lawyers Helping
Lawyers, 20 ARK. LAw. 36 (Jan. 1986).
124. See generally Goldstein, The Role of Alcoholism in Judicial Discipline Decisions, 16 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 549
(1985); Note, In re Driscoll: Illinois' New Approach in the Discipline of Alcoholic Attorney Misconduct, 31 DE PAUL .
REv. 433 (1982).
125. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Willemain, 305 Md. 665, 680, 506 A.2d 245, 253 (1986).
126. Waysman v. State Bar, 41 Cal. 3d 452, 459, 714 P.2d 1239, 1244, 224 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105 (1986).
127. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Headley, 475 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 1985) (attorney placed on 6 to 12 month
suspension for failure to pay bar dues, in light of attorney's seeking alcoholism rehabilitation); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Silva, 63 Haw. 585, 595, 633 P.2d 538, 545 (1981) (attorney disbarred for misappropriation of client's funds,
in light of lack of showing of progress in alcoholism rehabilitation); In re Johnson, 332 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982)
(court suspends and publicly censures attorney for misappropriaton of funds, and adopts five criteria for determining when
alcoholism should be given weight as a mitigating factor); In re Kumbera, 91 Wash. 2d 401, 405, 588 P.2d 1167, 1170
(1979) (attorney suspended for one year for misappropriation of funds, in light of attorney's having sought and received
treatment for alcoholism).




132. We do not completely close the door. We never will. The Alcoholism Advisory Committee established
by interested lawyers and professionals has already aided the Court and the disciplinary process in understanding
these issues. New efforts undertaken by the State Bar Association give reason to hope that we may someday
better begin to understand and deal with the effects of this disease in the profession. See also R. 1:20-9
(incapacity and "disability inactive" status).
In re Hein, 104 N.J. 297, 305, 516 A.2d 1105, 1108-09 (1986).
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dependency as mitigating will be unlikely to deter future alcoholism. For this special
problem, as well as the related problem of drug dependency, some approach between
the two extremes should be sought. The Disability Inactive Status is one alternative. 
133
Another alternative may be suspension for a term with reinstatement conditioned upon
the attorney's rehabilitation.
While some states have also considered youth or inexperience as a potential
mitigating factor, t34 in a case of misappropriation these factors seem of little
relevance. As one court has noted, "[t]his offense against common honesty should be
clear even to the youngest."' 135 There is no reason to believe that a young dishonest
lawyer will become more honest as he grows older, t36 and the profession should not
ask the public to bear such a risk.
3. Need for Consistency
The preceding discussion has evaluated the consideration of mitigating factors in
cases of misappropriation. The array of such factors, however, is not limited to those
analyzed above. The wide variety of mitigating factors considered and the consequent
inconsistency in sanctions imposed has led commentators to note:
While it is true that some of the evidence in mitigation merits consideration, much of what
is presented under the rubric of mitigation would insult the intelligence of the average
layman. That those who are responsible for disciplinary adjudication accept some of this
mitigation may help to explain the status which the legal profession enjoys among the public
and does not promote confidence in the concept of lawyer self-regulation. 37
Disciplinary bodies must do more than pay lip service to their own stated view
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the misappropriation of client funds. 138
The mitigating circumstances normally considered in attorney disciplinary cases are
not as compelling in cases of misappropriation. Discipline for such a breach of
common honesty should not be lessened simply because the attorney subsequently
returns misappropriated money or feels remorse for having committed the wrong.
However, courts continue to give substantial weight to these and other factors, and
thus sanctions currently being imposed are inconsistent and inappropriately lenient
and inconsistent with the fundamental goals of attorney self-regulation. This practice
133. Many states have created a "Disability Inactive Status" under which they place attorneys who are subject to
some temporary infirmity. See, e.g., AL4. R. Disc. EmoRc. R.20 (1984); I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 758 (Smith &
Hurd 1985); IowA Sup. CT. R. 118.16; NEB. Sup. CT. R. Disc. Peoc. R.11.
134. See, e.g., Eshleman's Case, 126 N.H. 1, 6, 489 A.2d 571, 574 (1985) (While the court considered the
attorney's youth and inexperience, it concluded that these factors alone were not sufficient to justify a lesser sanction.).
135. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 460, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157 (1979).
136. See Dubin & Schwartz, supra note 62, at 26-27.
137. Id. at 29.
138. See supra section III.C.. It is recognized that "disbarment" does not represent the same sanction in every
jurisdiction. While in some states a disbarred attorney will never again be permitted to practice law, the majority of states
allow a disbarred attorney to apply for readmission after a period of time. However, even where reinstatement is possible,
the ABA recommends a presumption against readmission. SAscnoN STA'NDARs, supra note 13, Standard 2.2 Commentary.
Thus when any court says "disbarment" is usually warranted in misappropiation, a permanent revocation of license is
intended.
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places both public confidence in the profession as a self-regulating body and the
perception of efficiency and fairness of the disciplinary process at risk.139
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to evaluate the role of the bar in the preservation
of client funds. While the profession enjoys the privilege of self-regulation, that
authority carries the responsibility of protecting the public and preserving public
confidence in the administration of justice. 140 Therefore, the profession must do all
that it can to see that client funds are not mishandled. This includes educating
attorneys in the maintenance of trust accounts14 1 as well as direct policing of those
accounts.142 In response to all forms of attorney misconduct, the profession should
make every effort to see that victims are fully compensated.' 43
Finally, discipline for knowing misappropriation must be severe and must be
imposed with greater consistency. Some states hold that disbarment is the only
appropriate sanction despite mitigating circumstances. This Comment does not go so
far as to adopt that approach. However, it is clear that the mitigating circumstances
usually offered and considered in disciplinary proceedings should be entitled to less
weight in a case of misappropriation, where the attorney has shown an inability to act
with common honesty. Recognizing that such misconduct warrants disbarment,
courts should be reluctant to impose a lesser sanction. The public relies on the
profession to license attorneys who can be trusted, and the public must be assured that
this reliance is not misplaced.144
Philip F. Downey
139. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. "If the American Bar does not do its duty to the public
good . . . then its trust will be taken away and public regulation will soon be making decisions for the profession which
the profession should be making itself." Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J.
11, 18 (Nov. 1983).
141. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
143. See supra section III.B.
144. A judgment of disbarment terminates the lawyer's status as a member of the bar. This is the proper
discipline for stealing. It is high time we impose that discipline and discard our image of being a toothless tiger.
The Bar thinks that is the appropriate discipline, the public is entitled to that protection and this court should
do no less.
Florida Bar v. Kent, 484 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 1986) (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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